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Milner: A Naval Historian’s Critique of the Normandy Campaign

Marc Milner

A

s the son of a Normandy campaign veteran I
have lived with - a n d relived - the campaign
for as long as I can remember. When I began to
teach military history the Normandy campaign
f o u n d a p r o m i n e n t p l a c e in my c l a s s r o o m
analysis of WW II battle practice. By t h e n I h a d
also largely b o u g h t into t h e two d o m i n a n t
paradigms of the Normandy fighting. The first
was t h a t while the Americans ground their way
doggedly (if ineptly) t h r o u g h the bocage, the
excellent t a n k country a r o u n d Caen was wasted
by the Anglo-Canadians. The second paradigm
followed naturally from the first. The Allies fought
poorly in Normandy while the G e r m a n s fought
superbly. We h a d won through w h a t J o h n Ellis
calls "brute force." 1

My comfortable notions about the Normandy
campaign were profoundly altered by a tour of
the Anglo-Canadian battlefields in 1991, a n d by
a second one this p a s t spring which ventured
into t h e A m e r i c a n zone. The experience so
shattered my assumptions that it is hard to know
where to start. But p e r h a p s it is best to begin
with the ground.
Gordon A. Harrison, a u t h o r of the US Army's
official history, Cross-Channel Attack, broke the
Norman topography into five areas:
the north Cotentin (rolling uplands north of
Valognes), the south Cotentin (generally flat and
well watered), the Bessin (the coastal strip lying
between Isigny and Bayeux), the Bocage (hilly
wooded country extending south of the Bessin
and Cotentin nearly to the base of the Brittany
Peninsula) and the relatively open Caen country
from Bayeux east and southeast. 2

The Bessin west of Bayeux a n d the s o u t h e r n
C o t e n t i n w e r e seized q u i c k l y following t h e
landings, and the northern Cotentin was a
strategic dead end. The Bocage a n d the open
ground a r o u n d Caen lay between the Allies a n d
a b r e a k - o u t of the b e a c h h e a d , t h u s they
c o m m a n d attention in the Normandy literature
a n d are the focus of this paper.
Illustrations (see next page) serve better t h a n
words to describe the bocage (which seems to be
used synonymously with "hedgerow country").
A Canadian, familiar with the great open area
a r o u n d Caen, is s t r u c k by the n a t u r e of the
ground south a n d s o u t h e a s t of Bayeux in w h a t
became the British sector. The ground a r o u n d
Villers-Bocage a n d C a u m o n t is steeply rolling,
with open fields guarded by hedgerows a n d deep,
wooded valleys. The American bocage further
west of Bayeux is even more b r o k e n by
hedgerows.
The ground s o u t h a n d west of Bayeux
profoundly shaped the character a n d tempo of
the battle. The British bocage is noteworthy for
two major offensives. The first was a t h r u s t south
of Bayeux that commenced on 11 J u n e . It came
to a halt two days later w h e n leading elements of
the 7 t h A r m o u r e d Division were s t o p p e d by
Michael Wittman's Tiger t a n k outside VillersBocage: the spearhead of Panzer Lehr Division.
The British reacted by flattening Villers-Bocage
from the air a n d cancelling the advance. 3 The
second, Operation "Bluecoat" - t h e so-called
British b r e a k o u t on 30 J u l y - w a s l a u n c h e d
against an enfeebled enemy. Nonetheless, the
British found their own bocage t o u g h going:
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An aerial photo showing the
typical bocage that covers much
of
Normandy.
The
ancient
patchwork
of
individual fields
formed by the hedgerows which
bound them proved a serious
tactical problem for both
the
American
and British
armies.
The height of the hedgerows is
indicated by the length of the
shadows, in many cases, taller
than the buildings at the lower
left.
WLU Air Photo 305/4042
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enough that the crisis in British infantry
casualties was attributed to it.4 It is interesting
to note, however, that they launched only two
major operations in the bocage in nearly two
months of continuous fighting (to be fair, the
opening stages of "Epsom" passed through
bocage as well): a point I shall return to. The
"real" bocage fighting, of course, fell to the US
Army slogging its way south along either side of
the Vire River. But here, too, there were very few
(two?) major operations. I had always thought it
odd that there were so few distinguishable
"battles" in the American Normandy campaign.
In contrast, action in the open ground
around Caen was characterized by quite distinct
operational level battles: "Epsom," "Charnwood,"
"Goodwood," "Spring," "Totalize," "Tractable" and
others. Indeed, the difference in the structure of
the campaign on the two fronts lends credence
to the criticism that Montgomery preferred setpiece battles, which were a sign of his caution
and the ineffectiveness of British fighting in
general. Meanwhile, the dogged Americans,
buoyed by greater personnel reserves and driven
by a more aggressive doctrine, moved steadily
against the Germans through the hedgerows.
It is a comfortable image, and one popularly
accepted. But the ground had a profound
impact on the shape of the campaign, and some
historians have noted that. So long as the
Germans retained any reserves of manpower and
the ability to move men and equipment, and so
long as the Allies were stuck to the roads, fighting
in the bocage was simply a grinding, murderous
battle of attrition. In the case of the US Army, it
was possible to grind forward through the bocage
in battalion or regimental level operations, and
it did so - as its casualty statistics reveal (US
casualties by the end of the Normandy campaign
were significantly higher than those of the AngloCanadians).
The ability to infiltrate the hedgerow country
had, in fact, been seen as one of the benefits of
fighting in the bocage in the first place. In such
terrain it would be hard for the enemy to prevent
gradual infiltration, and once the Allies were in,
extremely hard for the Germans to knock them
out with a single, strategic counterattack. 5 So,
before 6 June 1944 the bocage looked good - or
at least planners were able to put a positive spin
on it.

The idea that broken, heavily wooded ground
was suitable for infiltration was not limited to
Normandy or to the Allies. The ground in front
of the main German Gothic Line position in
northern Italy, between the Metauro and Foglia
Rivers, is rugged, hilly c o u n t r y - p e r h a p s
quintessentially I t a l i a n - w i t h deep, heavily
wooded ravines cutting into sharp hillsides,
narrow winding roads, picturesque villages,
and razor-backed ridges. Looking at the ground
from the village of Montemaggiore (south of the
Metauro) in 1985 I hazarded a guess that a
determined enemy could delay an attacker for
weeks over such ground. Dominick Graham, a
veteran himself, a distinguished gunner and
military historian, and leader of the tour merely
frowned. Gazing at me over the rims of his
glasses he said wearily, "Yes, and you could
slip the whole bloody Chinese army through!
No good fields of fire, Marc!-Too hard to
defend. Wait till you see the main position."
When we reached the southern edge of the
Foglia valley I understood precisely what he
meant. The main German position was laid out
north of the river, on wide, totally open, rolling
ground, sloping towards the river like the glacis
of some great fortress. The broad open valley
in front of that fortress was a killing ground,
and there was virtually no cover up the grassy
slopes beyond. Infiltration was not possible. Here
was ground that could be defended with fire.
If open ground can be defended by fire, then
the bocage had to be defended by men and it
could only be won by men fighting at close range
in a steady brawl. When I saw the ground it
immediately b e c a m e a p p a r e n t why the
American advance was so undramatic. No great
wind-up, followed by a crash of army groups of
artillery and a mad dash by whole divisions and
corps for some distant strategic objective.
Rather, the US advance was characterized by a
steady grind and then the "sudden" capture of
places: Carentan, St. Sauveur, Barneville,
Valognes, Cherbourg and, finally, the high
ground west of St. Lô.
I had read about all of this, of course, but
rather typically for a Canadian I ascribed this
rather featureless campaigning to the lack of
any serious opposition to the US Army. Afterall,
all the tanks were opposite the Anglo-Canadian
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armies around Caen, all the US faced were
infantry, a few tanks and a few SPs.
This was, of course, not what the Americans
had bargained for. The bocage threw the burden
of battle on the infantry when so much of current
doctrine relied on support from the tanks.
Harrison described the frustration during the
advance of V Corps towards St. Lo in mid-June.
"One of the prime difficulties faced by the
Americans in this terrain was in coordinating
tanks and infantry." German defences consisted
of anti-tank guns heavily supported by machine
guns, and mortars, all well concealed in the
hedgerows. "Tanks could not go forward to
knock out the m a c h i n e g u n s , " Harrison
observed, "nor could the infantry spearhead the
advance to take out the anti-tank guns." 6
Not surprisingly, the advance was slow.
David Eisenhower captured the frustration of
American troops - and the mood of subsequent
historians - when he opined that in the bocage
"the superior mobility of the American Sherman
was being nullified on a battlefield carved up
into 150-yard plots." 7 In such a static battle
and at short ranges the advantage went to the
"slower, more heavily armed German Mark V
and Mark VI Panther-Tiger tanks..." which
Eisenhower claimed were appearing "in large
numbers [?]..." 8 by mid-July. It is clear that
David Eisenhower and many Americans then
and now felt that if they could only get clear of
the bocage their Shermans could run free.
The ground, of course, dictated otherwise.
Bradley's one serious attempt at strategic
mobility in the bocage prior to "Cobra," the
launching of Middleton's VIII corps towards
Coutances in early July, was expected to be "a
slow, costly overland battle of attrition, through
'perfect defensive terrain.'" 9 And so it was. By
the 10th Middleton was effectively stalled and
the offensive became, in the end, a battle for a
good start line for "Cobra."
In the end, the US Army achieved strategic
mobility west of St. LÔ on 25 July as a result of
five factors: attrition of the enemy to a point
where the front was held by a veneer with no
r e s e r v e s at t h e o p e r a t i o n a l level; the
concentration of German Panzer forces to the
east around Caen; a high degree of co-operation
achieved with supporting tactical air forces

(much more effective than contemporary British
practice); good training provided to experienced
troops; and the astonishing mobility given to
the Americans in the bocage by invention of
hedgerow cutters for tanks.
None of this could be pulled magically from
a hat, or even from previous experience, prior
to 6 June 1944. It is tempting to think that the
German army could have been beaten by some
lightening strategic strike in the summer of
1944, following which they all would have
surrendered. But that was not the character of
the German army. As in the final Allied push of
1918, in 1944 the Germans had to be grounddown at great cost. If fighting in the hedgerows
was costly and frustrating for the Americans,
it was no less so for the Germans.
Fighting in the bocage was also, ultimately,
successful for the Allies. As Brigadier A.L.
Pemberton commented in the War Office history
of British artillery, "despite the difficult 'going'"
the British experienced in the bocage during
the initial stages of Operation "Epsom" in June,
"the rate of advance was faster than had been
customary in the mountains of Italy" to which
he c o m p a r e d the worst of t h e N o r m a n
countryside. 10 This may not have been what
those in France wanted to hear, b u t it is
suggestive of the larger problems of the era.
The close c o u n t r y s i d e of the bocage
nonetheless made the open ground around
Caen look ideal for a rapid advance. Good tank
country, vast open spaces, rolling wheat fields
ideally suited to mechanized forces. Some have
suggested that had the two Allied armies been
reversed in p o s i t i o n - t h e cautious AngloCanadians in the west and the fire-breathing
Americans in the plains around Caen - the
whole campaign would have gone much better,
and the breakout achieved much sooner. The
ground suggests otherwise.
The area in a radius often to 20 miles around
Caen itself and stretching down the highway to
Falaise and south along the Dives River is a
rolling plain. Although it is cut by wooded river
valleys and dotted by compact stone villages, the
dominant feature is the broad, prairie-like fields,
wide vistas, flat crests and distant horizons. This
was the ground chosen by the Overlord planners
for airfields, and the g r o u n d over which
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Two views of "good tank country. "
Above: A crossroads on the CaenFalaise highway.
The open, rolling
nature of the plain is evident. Allied
vehicles cover the landscape as far as
the eye can see - an 88 gunner's
delight.
Right: An oblique aerial photo showing
the same area from a different angle.
The Caen-Falaise highway is visible at
the right along with the quarry at
Hautmesnil. The forested area at the
top is Quesnay Wood.
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Montgomery is alleged to have wanted to "crack
about in tanks." It is, in no small measure, the
ground the Americans eyed with envy.
But instead of "cracking about" in tanks,
the Anglo-Canadians stalled around Caen, and
Monty - true to form - resorted to a series of setpiece battles at the operational level: using
massive firepower in lieu of tactical sophistry.
The result was a different kind of battle of
attrition, no strategic breakout, and enduring
criticism of Montgomery. Montgomery later
claimed that his offensives in the Caen area
were never intended to break out. Rather their
purpose was to draw the weight of German
armour onto that front in order to free the
Americans for their break-out. The ground
suggests that both of these assumptions are
far too simplistic. So what happened?
The open terrain in the eastern beachhead
is a natural glacis easily defended by fire. Here
the Germans not only had the advantage of
ground, they also had two others. First, they
were usually defending. Second, they had a vast
number of powerful, high velocity, long-range
tank and anti-tank guns. All of these, like the
vaunted 88 mm of the Tigers and the towed
variants, the long-barrelled 75 mm of the Mark
IV and Panthers, and even the small 75 mm
towed Pak 40, had muzzle velocities in excess
of 3,000 feet per second. 11 All of these could
pierce the front armour of a Sherman at more
than 1,000 yards, and in the case of the larger
guns -like the 88's - could take out most Allied
tanks at twice that range. 12
Powerful guns allowed the open fields around
Caen to be defended by fire against armour: a
situation which cut both ways. For example,
every German armoured assault failed. The first,
on D-Day when some 40 tanks of the 21st Panzer
Division attacked the western flank of 3rd British
Division near the beaches, was seen-off smartly
with heavy losses by both tanks and anti-tank
guns. 13 That assault, and one the next day on
the leading elements of the 3rd Canadian
Division near Authie, were delivered by Mark IVs,
t a n k s roughly equivalent to the S h e r m a n
although with perhaps a better gun. In the case
of the attack on the Canadians near Authie, two
companies of Mark IVs of the 12th SS (Hitler
Youth) Panzer Division were engaged by the
Shermans of the Sherbrooke Fusiliers Regiment

on open ground in a swirling action. The
Sherbrookes claimed somewhere between 31
and 41 Mark IVs destroyed at a loss of 21 of
their own tanks. 14
So much for the Mark IVs. But the Mark Vs the legendary Panther - fared no better. On 9
June, as part of a series of vicious counterattacks
on the Canadian 7th Brigade, which got astride
the Caen-Bayeux highway, the 12th SS Panzer
Division committed two companies of Panthers
in a desperate attempt to clear the road after a
number of intense infantry assaults failed.
The armoured assault, advancing over open
ground on The Regina Rifles' position straddling
the road at Bretteville-l'Orgueilleuse and Norreyen-Bessin, failed. Canadian fire stripped German
infantry away from their tanks, which were met
with a hail of anti-tank fire. "We were surprised,"
Kurt Meyer, the 26th Regiment's commander,
recalled later, "by heavy anti-tank weapons. " For
a while the Panthers were reduced to a petulant
shelling of Bretteville from 300 yards and when
finally they entered the village, "The Canadians
swarmed the advancing armour." 1 5 The
Canadians claimed 12 Panthers destroyed, the
Germans admitted to six.
Undaunted, Meyer sent 12 Panthers out the
next morning to attack the advanced position of
the Reginas, a single company dug in at Norreyen-Bessin just south of the rail line. Once again
concentrated small arms and artillery fire drove
the German infantry to ground, but the Panthers
pressed on. As they closed on Norrey, the
Panthers turned slightly south in order to present
their frontal armour to the 6-pounder anti-tank
guns at the crest of the gentle slope running up
to Norrey. Just then nine Shermans of the Fort
Garry Horse, including several Fireflies Shermans re-equipped with the British 17pounder gun - deployed south of Bretteville, just
1,000 yards from the attacking Panthers. Seven
of the Panthers were destroyed in minutes. The
German attack collapsed. So much for the
Panthers.
As Hubert Meyer, Chief of Staff of the 12th
SS Panzer Division, observed, "The anti-tank
weapons around Bretteville were so powerful that
outflanking movements to the north and south
were thwarted."16 As Oliver Haller concluded in
his superb analysis of the action, "It became

12
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol7/iss2/2

6

Milner: A Naval Historian’s Critique of the Normandy Campaign

A 12th SS Panther knocked out by Canadian infantry in Bretteville-l'Orgueilleuse.

evident that offensive operations had become
dangerous undertakings - a reality that would
plague the Allies for the remainder of the
Normandy campaign...." 17 When Kurt Meyer
reported to General Geyr von Schweppenburg,
commander of Panzer Group West, on 9 J u n e
that his best tanks could not budge Canadian
infantry from their fortified villages, von
Schweppenburg answered, "My dear Meyer, the
war can only now be won through political
means." 18
So the best of the masters of mobile warfare,
equipped with the best tank of the campaign
and led by veterans of the eastern front failed
in the earliest days of the Normandy campaign
to loosen the front and achieve a decisive
s t r a t e g i c r e s u l t . Indeed, t a n k s failed at
Bretteville and Norrey to achieve even a tactical
victory. Inexperience, you say? The men who
saw them off were the utterly inexperienced and
rather ordinary citizen soldiers of the 3rd
Canadian Division.19
The Germans fared no better when they
launched much larger armoured assaults. The
l a r g e s t of the N o r m a n d y c a m p a i g n saw
elements of five Panzer divisions hurled against
the western flank of "Epsom" at the end of June.
These attacks were destroyed "by massed
artillery fire with devastating effect, and all but
one of their attacks were dispersed before
reaching our forward infantry positions." 20

It has been customary to apologize for
German failure, noting that they never had a
chance to mass armour for a proper assault and
were hounded from the air. But these are weak
and perhaps spurious arguments. It cannot be
claimed that the Allies fought poorly and at the
same time assert that the failure of the Germans
to organize themselves sufficiently for a major
counterattack was an act of God, or the air force.
Steady Allied pressure on the front counted for
something. In any event, as Pemberton points
out, the attack on "Epsom" was stopped by guns.
The Panthers at Bretteville and Norrey were
beaten by anti-tank fire. In the end, fully 63 to
65 per cent of the German tanks destroyed in
Normandy fell to gunfire: tactical, battlefield
fighting.21 So if the Germans, particularly the
Panthers, could not move effectively against Allied
anti-tank fire, what hope did regiments of
Shermans have against the tremendous number
of German high velocity guns?
The stalemate around Caen was, therefore,
the result of open ground wholly dominated by
superior fire. Movement simply invited instant
death from as much as 3,000 yards away. That
great and powerful armoured phalanx called
Operation "Goodwood" was shaped by the
vulnerability of Allied tanks and the superiority
of G e r m a n fire. N u m b e r s a n d m a s s i v e
supporting fire support - delivered from land,
sea and air - was the only way to cut through
the German defences, which were typically
13
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Canadian soldiers examine the deadly
German "88. " A shell (visible at centre)
fired from this gun was capable of
destroying Allied tanks at virtually any
range.
side before getting killed. This was
easier said than done.

deployed in depth, with mutually supporting
lines of dug-in tanks and anti-tank guns. In
the case of "Goodwood" there were 11 such
lines, with hundreds of high velocity anti-tanks
guns aimed at vulnerable targets. So the AngloCanadians led with infantry, set objectives
within range of supporting field artillery, rushed
forward anti-tank guns and a FOO and waited
for the counterattack - very much the way the
German army was fought to a bloody shambles
in 1917-1918.
In no small way the fighting around Caen is
exemplified by the ill-fated Canadian attack up
Verrières Ridge on 25 July, Operation "Spring."
The Canadian II Corps had won the first bit of
high ground south of Caen in the final stages of
"Goodwood." According to historians, what lay
before them was the excellent tank country of
the Caen-Falaise Plain. The ground is, in fact,
not flat, but a series of gently rolling hills of great
tactical significance. As a rule, the Germans held
the far crest with anti-tanks guns and dug-in
t a n k s and m a c h i n e g u n s , with powerful
armoured and Panzer Grenadier forces in
immediate reserve. It was the Canadians' task
to roll down the slope from their own position,
across the bottom of the bowl and up the far
14
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Plans for Operation "Spring" called
for two b r i g a d e s of C a n a d i a n
infantry to breech the forward
German defences, and then two
British armoured divisions would
p a s s through and "exploit." The
task was, however, much more than
six battalions of infantry could
accomplish. The Caen-Falaise Plain
was defended by the 1st SS Panzer
Corps, with support from elements
of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps which
overlooked the Canadian attack
from across the Orne River (on
ground the British could not hold
during "Epsom"). Directly in front
of the Canadians lay an awesome
array of the firepower. Around
Verrières village itself was 1st SS [Liebstandart
Adolf Hitler) Panzer Division, reinforced by the
101st SS Schwer Panzer Abteilung (Tiger I); the
12th SS Hitlerjugend Panzer Division was just
out of the action to the east. The western end
of Verrières Ridge was held by the very ordinary
272nd Infantry Division, but it was powerfully
reinforced by elements of the 10th SS Panzer
Division, the 9th SS Panzer Division and an
armoured kampfgruppe from the 2nd Panzer
Division, with the "Koenig Tigers" (Tiger II) of
the 503 Schwer Panzer Abteilung in immediate
reserve behind the front. Providing direct fire
support from across the Orne onto Verrières
Ridge were the 10th SS Panzer Division and
the Tigers of the 102nd SS Schwer Panzer
Abteilung. The 2nd Panzer, 9th SS Panzer and
116th Panzer Divisions were in immediate
reserve behind the front. Thus, most of the
estimated 650 tanks and assault guns on the
British front were within firing range or a few
minutes driving distance of the Canadian attack
on 25 July 1944. The number of towed antit a n k g u n s available to t h e G e r m a n s is
unknown, to me at least.
The Canadian attack failed. While the leading
elements of "Cobra" were slogging their way
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Sherman tanks of the Fort Garry Horse left to rust on a hillside near Tilly-la-Campagne. These tanks were
destroyed during Operation "Spring," and this photo was taken the following year.
through the bocage, Canadian infantry surged
across the open, fire-swept ground south of Caen
trying to get to the enemy before the barrage lifted
or they were shot down. The infantry gained a
lasting foothold only in Verrières village itself.
There the Royal Hamilton Light Infantry dug in
about 1,000 yards from their start line and
moved up their own 6-pounder anti-tank guns,
while towed 17-pounders and two squadrons of
British tanks were deployed in depth behind all firing over o p e n g r o u n d . Savage
counterattacks by the 1st SS were beaten off
by massed artillery, machine gun, anti-tank
and tank fire. Verrières was retained, but it
remained a thin salient on the crest of the ridge.
To the east, along the valley of the Orne River
where the enemy had excellent observation and
fields of fire from across the river, the German
counterattacks were more successful. Tanks,
assault guns and panzer grenadiers drove as
far north as the original Canadian start line
on Point 67 before being driven back.
Operation "Spring" is either ignored in
accounts of Normandy or, if mentioned at all,
portrayed as another example of ineffective
"British" fighting and lack of commitment, or
both. 22 Anyone who walks the slopes of Verrières
Ridge, c o u n t s the barrels pointed in the
Canadian direction and assesses the natural

strength of the German position can only wonder
at why the attack was mounted in the first place.
There is an on-going debate among Canadian
historians whether "Spring" was a holding action
or a legitimate attempt at breakout. Whatever it
was, the fighting was brutal and bloody: the
second bloodiest day of the war for Canada (after
Dieppe). The feint in support of "Cobra" cost
Canada nearly 2,000 wounded, including almost
500 dead, about the same casualty bill as that
suffered by the two US divisions on Omaha beach
on D-Day. It is significant that when Field
Marshal Kluge had to chose between which front
to visit on 25 July 1944 he ended up on the
slopes of Verrières Ridge.
It is curious, in retrospect, that this rolling
piece of open farmland - the prized avenue for a
strategic breakout south of Caen - was given to
the Canadian Corps to tackle. One gets a sense
that the British wanted out. Indeed, after
"Goodwood" the good ground south of Caen was
left to the Canadians, the Poles and a couple of
British divisions to handle. The main British
effort shifted - interestingly enough - to the
bocage country south of Bayeux! Perhaps MajorGeneral George Kitching's meeting with General
Sir Miles Dempsey, commander of Second
British Army, is revealing on this point. Kitching
commanded the 4th Canadian A r m o u r e d
15
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Division, which became operational as part of
II Canadian Corps at the end of July. The first
thing Dempsey asked Kitching when they met
in Normandy was "Are your tanks petrol or
diesel?" As Kitching recalled, "When I told him
they
were
petrol,
he
seemed
disappointed...General Dempsey wished that
our t a n k s were diesel and, as we became
involved in battle, so did we."23 Petrol driven
tanks caught fire easily when their engine
compartments were pierced and tank crews
displayed an understandable reluctance to
expose themselves to enemy fire. Maybe the
British felt they were better off in the bocage:
the short ranges largely overcame the limits on
their own guns and, besides, nothing was proof
against the "88. "24
The essential problem was that the enemy
had the long range, high velocity anti-tank guns
and we had the little tanks that burned. The
Allies also had to attack. The Canadian solution
to the problem south of Caen was to adopt
massed armoured assaults - dense phalanxes
of tanks and armoured personnel carriers - in
poor visibility with massive fire support,
including strategic bombing. "Totalize," launched
on 8 August at night, Operation "Tractable"
launched amid smoke and dust on 14 August
were qualified successes against what was, by
then, a much weakened enemy (although one
still well equipped with scores of anti-tank guns).
The Canadians eventually exploited their
success, pushing down beyond Falaise, towards
Trun, St. Lambert-sur-Dives, Chambois and,
perhaps, Argentan. Why they went is, to me at
least, most inconceivable. By then, of course,
the Germans were on the run and we were
trying to link-up with Patton's Third Army
advancing from the south. In between lay the
rump of the German Seventh Army and Panzer
Group West, which were trying to pass through
the same ground, while strong German forces
attacked from the east to hold the FalaiseArgentan Gap open. When Bradley was asked
if he would push his armies north of Argentan
and stand in the way of the German escape he
rejected the idea. "Better a solid shoulder at
Argentan than a broken neck at Falaise!" was
his justly famous response. So what were the
Canadians and Poles doing south of Falaise,
wrestling with the most lethal tide of humanity
the west has ever witnessed?

Many Germans were able to slip through
the noose because the area south of Falaise,
particularly in the Trun-Chambois area and
beyond, i s - w e l l - b o c a g e . It strikes one as
genuinely odd looking over the countryside from
the Polish monument at Mount Ormel that,
while the Americans fought desperately for two
months to get out of the bocage, the Canadian
"breakthrough" south of Caen led them straight
into it!
In fact, one look at the ground south of
Falaise explains why the Germans fought so
fiercely to the n o r t h . Martin B l u m e n s o n
suggested many years ago that, "The Germans
m a s s e d their forces [around Caen]...not
because Montgomery drew them there but
because they were trying to fulfil a purpose of
their own."25 Blumenson argues, quite rightly,
that the Germans wanted to use the good tank
country around Caen to launch their own
single, knock-out blow. But it is also true that
it was easier to defend the open ground around
Caen with fire, than to prevent a steady Allied
infiltration of the bocage country to the south.
It h a s been suggested that the AngloAmericans relied too heavily on artillery, limited
their thinking to a few thousand yards and
failed to exploit their successes. Not only would
the Germans have done it better, the Russians,
too, would not have penny-pinched their way
forward.26 I used to subscribe to those views
but now I think they merely obscure the real
strengths and the real problems of the AngloAmericans in the Normandy fighting.
Whether it was because of their expertise
in artillery or the dreadful weakness of their
tanks, the Allies fought a grinding battle of
attrition in both the bocage and in the open
around Caen. The army that was whittled away,
often in near suicidal counterattacks was
German, not Allied. To argue that the western
Allies ought to have fought like Germans or
Russians is, in the end, pointless. There is a
strong element of cultural determinism in the
way all armies fight, even if they adopt
organization and doctrine derived from other
armies. In any event, German armoured attacks
invariably failed. And there was no room, nor
the reserves to adopt a Russian-style army
Front scale operation.
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So, would the US Army have fared better in
the open fields a r o u n d C a e n ? Hard to say. The
US equivalent of the 17-pounder anti-tank gun,
the 3-inch gun, features so little in the literature
it is h a r d to get a feel for its ability. If it is the
s a m e g u n as t h a t in the M-10 t a n k destroyer
t h e n the 3-inch was p e r h a p s not up to the task
of handling G e r m a n a r m o u r in the open at long
ranges (the success of the 3-inch in the close
country a r o u n d Mortain is another matter). The
17-pounder in particular, with a muzzle velocity
in excess of 3,000 ft per second in either the towed
or the Firefly version - a n d firing the new AP
r o u n d (which even the infantry battalion level 6p o u n d e r could fire) w a s a m a t c h for G e r m a n
t a n k s if well handled. In t h a t sense, Max Hasting
is adrift w h e n he said t h a t "the towed anti-tank
g u n was of little value to troops in attack." 27 Given
t h e G e r m a n d o c t r i n e of c o u n t e r a t t a c k , t h e
Canadian response (much as it h a d been in 19171918) w a s to seize g r o u n d , lay on defensive
supporting fire, move the anti-tank g u n s up a n d
kill G e r m a n s . It worked, b u t it wasn't fancy a n d
analysts have carped about it ever since.
Even without the 17-pounder the US Army
fighting around Caen would not have been driven
into the sea. Naval gunfire support would have
c r u s h e d G e r m a n a r m o u r e d o n s l a u g h t s if the
army's artillery h a d not done so already. Rommel
knew that, a n d after 9 J u n e 1944 so too did
S c h w e p p e n b u r g . B u t t h o s e little U S A r m y
S h e r m a n s would have brewed-up j u s t as easily
a r o u n d Caen as those of the Anglo-British armies
did. And so the US Army would have resorted to
large, set-piece battles to overcome the problem
of open ground dominated by superior enemy
fire. British historians would be carping about
the cautious Americans, a n d whining t h a t if only
Monty h a d h a d the open ground a r o u n d Caen
they would have been in Paris by the end of J u n e .
Or m a y b e not: its the ground, you see! - or
have I missed s o m e t h i n g h e r e ?
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